grab store: California Supreme Court

By Michelle Ball, California Education Attorney for Students since 1995

Parents often need all the help they can get in handling school expulsion hearings. One of my favorite cases to attack expulsion hearings for an utter lack of proper evidence is John A. v. San Bernardino City Unified School District, decided in 1982 by the California Supreme Court.

In this beautiful case, the California Supreme Court evaluated an expulsion of "John A." for allegedly being involved in a large altercation not witnessed by anyone but students. At John A's expulsion hearing, no direct witnesses (e.g. students who actually saw or were involved in the fight) testified, other than John A. Rather, the district's case revolved around reading a summary from the school into the record and written witness statements. When John A. spoke, he explained that he did not strike nor kick the boys involved. Rather, he said the boys were "play boxing." He denied any racial connection, that he yelled derogatory terms, or that he chased anyone. He also disputed the injuries alleged to two of the participants.

The district expelled him for an "unprovoked attack on two students." On appeal to the county board of education and even the lower court, the expulsion was upheld. Although the lower court later allowed the district to submit 30 declarations showing that there had been threats against students involved in school hearings, it appears that no evidence of any threat from John A. to the witnesses was provided.

The California Supreme Court, overturned the expulsion, ordering it expunged from John A's records. In its decision, Justice Broussard explained: "A decision of the governing board to expel must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence..." and "It [district] may not rely on administrative reports when evidence is conflicting and witnesses are readily available."

The court also discussed the denial of the right to cross examination and the evidence supporting the lack of witnesses (alleged witness danger), stating: "While the risk of retaliation may be substantial in some cases, it does not warrant board reliance on reports in all cases or in the instant case where there is no showing or finding of a significant and specific risk of harm..."

This case is significant in that it reinforces the fact that a student may not be expelled based on hearsay alone (see also Education Code §48918(f)) and that if the district wishes to rely on written testimony instead of calling live witnesses, they must show that "disclosure of identity and producing the witnesses would subject the informant to significant and specific risk of harm...."

This case is music to my ears. It not only backs up the education code, but gives an example of what districts cannot do. They cannot expel a student based solely on written statements without direct testimony showing the alleged act(s) occurred. Also, if they wish to exclude a witness and use his or her written statement instead, they must make a specific showing regarding harm. The legislature defines this further in Education Code 48918(f) as "unreasonable risk of psychological or physical harm."

For now, parents embroiled in an expulsion hearing must be aware that if their child did not confess to the alleged "crime" he or she is accused of, the district must provide at least some direct testimony at the expulsion hearing. If the district wants to substitute written statements for live testimony, they must make a specific showing of potential harm to the witness should they testify. This is an area which is often lacking and can be a great argument for appeal. Districts frequently fail to bring anyone who actually saw the alleged incident to the expulsion hearing, which could give the county board or courts a reason to overturn the expulsion altogether on appeal.

Best,

Michelle Ball
Education Law Attorney
LAW OFFICE OF MICHELLE BALL
717 K Street, Suite 228
Sacramento, CA 95814
Phone: 916-444-9064
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By Michelle Ball, California Education Attorney for Students since 1995

Have you ever wondered just HOW our schools are funded? A great summary is included in California Redevelopment Association v. Matosantos, handed down this week (December 29, 2011) by the Supreme Court of California.

Justice Werdegar, writing for the Court, ultimately upholds Assembly Bill 1X26 which authorizes the closing of redevelopment agencies in California. The case comes to a contrary opinion regarding Assembly Bill 1X27, a bill which gave a way for redevelopment agencies to remain open so long as they made certain payments.

Here is what Justice Werdegar states (excerpted from the California Redevelopment Association v. Matosantos case directly) in the "Background" section. I particularly like his wording when he says "a second event of seismic significance...," cute considering we are in California!

"A. Government Finance: The Integration of State, School, and Municipal Financing

For much of the 20th century, state and local governments were financed independently under the "separation of sources" doctrine. In 1910, the Legislature proposed, and the voters approved, a constitutional amendment granting local governments exclusive control over the property tax. (Cal. Const., art. XIII, former § 10, enacted by Sen. Const. Amend. No. 1, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 1910); see Simmons, California Tax Collection: Time for Reform (2008) 48 Santa Clara L.Rev. 279, 285-286; Ehrman & Flavin, Taxing Cal. Property (4th ed. 2011) §§ 1:9-1:10, p. 1-14.) Each jurisdiction (city, county, special district, and school district) could levy its own independent property tax. (See, e.g.,Temescal Water Co. v. Niemann (1913) 22 Cal.App. 174, 176 ["It is conceded . . . that a municipality has the right to assess all real property found within its limits for the purpose of maintaining the municipal revenues, and that the county taxing officials have the right to levy upon the same property for county purposes."].)

This system of finance had significant consequences for education. Under the state Constitution, the Legislature is obligated to provide for a public school system. (Cal. Const., art. IX, § 5; Wells v. One2One Learning Foundation (2006)39 Cal.4th 1164, 1195.) Seeking to promote local involvement, the Legislature established school districts as political subdivisions and delegated to them that duty. (Wells, at p. 1195; Butt v. State of California (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 680-681; see also California Teachers Assn. v. Hayes (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1523.) Historically, school districts were largely funded out of local property taxes. (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 592 (Serrano I); Serrano v. Priest (1976) 18 Cal.3d 728, 737-738 (Serrano II); see County of Los Angeles v. Sasaki (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1442, 1450.) Under the California system of financing as it {Slip Opn. Page 5} existed until the 1970's, different school districts could levy taxes and generate vastly different revenues; because of the difference in property values, the same property tax rate would yield widely differing sums in, for example, Beverly Hills and Baldwin Park. (Serrano I, at pp. 592-594.)

We invalidated that system of financing in Serrano I and Serrano II, holding that education was a fundamental interest (Serrano I, supra, 5 Cal.3d at pp. 608-609; Serrano II, supra, 18 Cal.3d at pp. 765-766) and that financing heavily dependent on local property tax bases denied students equal protection (Serrano I, at pp. 614-615; Serrano II, at pp. 768-769, 776). The Serrano decisions threw "the division of state and local responsibility for educational funding" into " 'a state of flux.' " (Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. County of Los Angeles (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 414, 419.) In their aftermath, a "Byzantine" system of financing (California Teachers Assn. v. Hayes, supra, 5 Cal.App.4th at p. 1525) evolved in which the state became the principal financial backstop for local school districts. Funding equalization was achieved by capping individual districts' abilities to raise revenue and enhancing state contributions to ensure minimum funding levels. (Lockard, In the Wake of Williams v. State: The Past, Present, and Future of Education Finance Litigation in California (2005) 57 Hastings L.J. 385, 388-391; see generally Wells v. One2One Learning Foundation, supra,39 Cal.4th at p. 1194 [discussing current funding regime].)

A second event of seismic significance followed shortly after, with the voters' 1978 adoption of Proposition 13. (Cal. Const., art. XIII A, added by Prop. 13, as approved by voters, Primary Elec. (June 6, 1978).) As noted, before 1978 cities and counties had been able to levy their own property taxes. Proposition 13 capped ad valorem real property taxes imposed by all local entities at 1 percent (Cal. Const., art. XIII A, § 1, subd. (a)), reducing the amount of revenue available by more than half (Stark,The Right to Vote on Taxes (2001) {Slip Opn. Page 6} 96 Nw.U. L.Rev. 191, 198). In place of multiple property taxes imposed by multiple political subdivisions, it substituted a single tax to be collected by counties and thereafter apportioned. (Cal. Const., art. XIII A, § 1, subd. (a).) Significantly, Proposition 13 did not specify how that 1 percent was to be divided, instead leaving the method of allocation to state law. (See Cal. Const., art. XIII A, § 1, subd. (a)[real property tax is "to be . . . apportioned according to law to the districts within the counties"]; Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 225-227; County of Los Angeles v. Sasaki, supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1454-1457; City of Rancho Cucamonga v. Mackzum (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 929, 945.)

Sasaki, supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1451-1452; California Teachers Assn. v. Hayes, supra, 5 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1527-1528.) Second, by failing to specify a method of allocation, Proposition 13 largely transferred control over local government finances from the state's many political subdivisions to the state, converting the property tax from a nominally local tax to a de facto state-administered tax subject to a complex system of intergovernmental grants. (See Rev. & Tax. Code, § 95 et seq.; Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 226-227; Sasaki, at pp. 1454-1455; Stark, The Right to Vote on Taxes, supra, 96 Nw.U. L.Rev. at p. 198.) fn. 3 Third, by imposing a unified, {Slip Opn. Page 7} shared property tax, Proposition 13 created a zero-sum game in which political subdivisions (cities, counties, special districts, and school districts) would have to compete against each other for their slices of a greatly shrunken pie.

In 1988, the voters added another wrinkle with Proposition 98, which established constitutional minimum funding levels for education and required the state to set aside a designated portion of the General Fund for public schools. (Cal. Const., art. XVI, § 8; see Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 420; California Teachers Assn. v. Hayes, supra, 5 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1517-1518.) Two years later, the voters revised and effectively increased the minimum funding requirements for public schools. (Prop. 111, Primary Elec. (June 5, 1990) amending Cal. Const., art. XVI, § 8; see County of Sonoma v. Commission on State Mandates (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1289.)

In response to these rising educational demands on the state treasury, the Legislature in 1992 created county educational revenue augmentation funds (ERAF's). (Stats. 1992, chs. 699, 700, pp. 3081-3125; Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 97.2, 97.3; see Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at pp. 420-421; City of El Monte v. Commission on State Mandates (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 266, 272-274; County of Los Angeles v. Sasaki, supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at p. 1447.) It reduced the portion of property taxes allocated to local governments, deposited the difference in the ERAF's, deemed the balances part of the state's General Fund for purposes of satisfying Proposition 98 {Slip Opn. Page 8} obligations, and distributed these amounts to school districts. (County of Sonoma v. Commission on State Mandates, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1275-1276; see Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 426 [ERAF's are an " 'accounting device' " for reallocating property taxes to school districts from other local government entities].) Periodically thereafter, the Legislature through supplemental legislation required local government entities to further contribute to the ERAF's in order to defray the state's Proposition 98 school funding obligations. (Los Angeles Unified School Dist., at pp. 420-421.) Local governments had no vested right to property taxes (id. at p. 425); accordingly, the Legislature could require ERAF payments as "an exercise of [its] authority to apportion property tax revenues." (City of El Monte, at p. 280; see Cal. Const., art. XIII A, § 1, subd. (a).)"

For more from this case, please see it here.

Where else could one find such a great summary of the complex background regarding school financing? Thank you your honor!

Best,

Michelle Ball
Education Law Attorney
LAW OFFICE OF MICHELLE BALL
717 K Street, Suite 228
Sacramento, CA 95814
Phone: 916-444-9064
Fax: 916-444-1209
Website: http://www.edlaw4students.com/

Blog: http://edlaw4students.blogspot.com/

Twitter: http://twitter.com/michelleaball

Youtube: http://www.youtube.com/user/EdLaw4Students

Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/pages/Law-Office-of-Michelle-Ball/191273330901857